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Abstract
This paper explores the economic eects of international immigration in
Spain by constructing a CGE model. We are mainly concerned about the
issue of labor mobility across sectors. In our simulations, we rst restrict
immigrants to work in a small set of industries receiving wages that are
below the native ones, a situation that we call the short run. Then, we
consider that immigrants can move freely among all the industries in the
economy earning wages on a par with local workers. This we call the long
run situation. The results suggest that short run economic performance can
be improved by choosing strategic sectors to receive immigrants. We also
nd evidence that the wage regime is an important parameter to explain the
impact both in the short and in the long run.
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1 Introduction
One of the topics related to international population movements that has been
attracting ever growing attention over the last number of years, both in political
debates and in scientic research, is that of illegal immigration.1 From the host
countries perspective, the basic role of immigration is probably to complete the
native labor supply. Thus, immigrants are welcome as long as they intend to get
a job in those activities where more workers are needed. Apparently, there is no
way of controlling the extent to which illegal immigration fullls this objective.
However, the fact that undocumented workers tend to concentrate in a select num-
ber of activities has often been adduced as characteristic of illegal immigration.2
Despite these activities varying from country to country, the fact that illegal im-
migrants do not freely move across sectors remains. There are a number of studies
devoted to explaining this evidence: Hill and Pearce (1990), for instance, showed
for the United States that a high number of undocumented workers concentrates
in services and construction. These authors concluded that the low concentration
at the establishment level of rms operating in these activities, as opposed to man-
ufacturing, makes them less likely to be inspected and, consequently, sanctioned
for hiring undocumented workers. Similarly, Taylor (1992) presents econometric
evidence that legal status influences the mobility of foreign workers in agricultural
activities. Hillman and Weiss (1999) suggest that the visibility of concentrations of
unauthorized workers implies the existence of permissible illegal immigration. In
other words, taking the presence of illegal immigrants in the host country as given,
owners of domestic factors may be interested in holding the situation constant as
long as illegal immigrants are locked in selective sectors. An interesting conclusion
stemming from all these studies is that this sector-specic enforcement, in fact,
transforms illegal workers into specic productive factors.
A key point, however, is whether this concentration in a small number of sectors
is specic to undocumented workers or whether it also applies to legal immigrants.
According to OECD,3 about 40% of legal immigrants in Germany work in man-
ufacturing, about 50% of legal immigrants are employed in transport and storage
and communications in Portugal, and in Spain it is in services (mostly tourism
activities) that more than 50% of work permits are granted. Despite the broad
denition of these activities, the gures illustrate that high concentration also oc-
curs in the case of legal immigrants. In this case, the sector-specic enforcement
argument does not work as well as in the former case. A useful way of explaining
this evidence is to think of the concentration of immigrants as a short-run eect
of a change in factor endowments, as opposed to the long-run eect where legal
immigrants can move across sectors.4 In the short run, immigrants enter the host
1See, for instance, Djajic (1997), Sarris and Zografakis (1999), Venturini (1999) or Hillman
and Weiss (1999).
2See Hillman and Weiss (1999) for a review of the empirical evidence.
3See Trends in International Migration (1999).
4See Mayer (1974).
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country to work in selective sectors, as a consequence of links with previous immi-
grants, or, for instance, because of the existence of network eects, and they are
temporarily stuck there. Later, in the long run, as they become more integrated
in the host country,5 they are able to get a job in dierent sectors.
The purpose of the present research is to compare the economic eects of immi-
grants being a specic factor xed in certain sectors or being perfectly mobile across
sectors. However, from the paragraphs above it seems clear that the causes of the
dierent mobility of immigrants could be related to their legal status. Therefore,
legal status should be taken into account, as it will play a crucial role in deter-
mining the economic eects on the host country. To deal with the legal status
of immigrants, we will focus on wage discrimination, as usually illegal immigrants
earn lower wages than legal ones, or native workers, even when they have the
same qualications. Likely the main reason is that national rms hiring illegal
immigrants face possible sanctioning by the authorities; thus, they minimize costs
by taking advantage of their bargaining position with regard to the undocumented
workers (see Ethier (1986), Bond and Chen (1987) or Sarris and Zografakis (1999)).
In fact, evidence shows signicant rises in the wages of workers after achieving legal
status.6
We approach the problem by constructing a computable general equilibrium
model for the Spanish economy. Spain, as other Southern countries in the Euro-
pean Union, has only become a net receiver of immigrants in recent years. Although
global migration flows have been steadily increasing, the rate of growth seems to be
stronger in those countries that have traditionally been a source of migratory flows
and, therefore, have not traditionally dealt with mass immigration. This change of
pattern explains why the debate about immigration has been particularly strong in
Spain, concerning topics such as the number of immigrants that should be allowed
to enter the country, and under what conditions. Thus, the eects of immigrants
displaying dierent levels of mobility in the economy under alternative legal status
constitute interesting topics for the Spanish case. In order to analyze the eects of
immigration, specially illegal immigration, computable general equilibrium models
provide a useful tool. First, immigration implies a change in the relative factor
endowments of both the host and the origin country, aecting suctorial produc-
tion and employment, relative prices and, therefore, income distribution. Thus, a
general equilibrium framework seems to naturally suit the study of this subject.
Second, simulation techniques represent a good alternative to econometric analysis,
given the lack of statistical coverage that is inherent in clandestine immigration.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we introduce the main features of
the model. Section 3 explains the calibration procedure while results are discussed
in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
5Because they increase their knowledge of the language and institutions, or they acquire new
skills in the host country, they eventually become more competitive with regard to native workers.
6See OECD’s Trends in International Migration (1999).
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2 The model
The model that we use to evaluate the impact of immigration is static and deals
with a single open economy disaggregated in eleven production sectors, with eleven
consumption goods, twelve households, and a public sector. In this section, we
simply provide a description of the essence of the model. Notation for variables
and parameters is in appendix 1, while all the equations that make up the model are
displayed in appendix 2. A more complete representation including mathematical
derivations can be found in Ferri et al. (2001).
The model is solved through Rutherford’s (1999) method who considers the
solution of general equilibrium models as a mixed complementarity problem (see
Mathiesen, 1985). Hence, there are three types of equations in the applied general
equilibrium model: those representing rms just breaking even, those representing
goods and factors markets clearing, and some additional ones referring to system
restrictions.
2.1 Production
We consider dierent specications for the production side of the model according
to the presence or absence of a specic factor in the production function. In fact,
the unskilled labor is introduced in some scenarios as a factor that can not move
freely among all the sectors.
Producers are subject to technology characterized by a three-nesting level and
constant returns to scale. The rst nesting level is a Leontief production function7
integrated by a composite of primary inputs and intermediate inputs. The second
nest divides the primary inputs composite, which is considered as a CES function
of labor and capital.
The third nesting level is a Cobb-Douglas composite8 of labor inputs integrated
by skilled and unskilled labor. At this point, we introduce some alternatives de-
pending on the assumption on factor specicity. In some cases, all the unskilled
workers are considered homogeneous and perfect mobility exists among sectors.
But in other cases, we assume that certain unskilled labor is in some sense locked
up in very few sectors so immigrants are not free to choose the sector of destina-
tion. Therefore, we use two kinds of unskilled labor in the model: specic and
non-specic. Although specic labor cannot move to work in sectors where such
a specic factor is not in demand, at sector level the perfect substitution between
unskilled native workers and immigrants remains. This means that immigrants are
allocated only among a few sectors and compete only with natives in these sectors.
>From the cost minimization problem we can obtain the zero prot equations
7The xed coecients assumption borne in Leontief functions is frequently used in applied
general equilibrium models, (see Dixon et al ., 1992- pp. 211-219). The rationale is that a wide
range of empirical studies do not prove that at this level changes in relative prices of inputs imply
changes in relative demands.
8See Biscourp and Gianella (2001) for an empirical test on this assumption.
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and market clearing conditions. Nevertheless, available data forces us to convert
eective production in distributed production with a xed coecients matrix, in
the same way as Ballard et al. (1985) (pp. 76-77).
Domestic distributed production is then used to obtain the total supply of
goods in this economy, which is composed of domestic production and imports,
modelled through a CES Armington9 aggregate. The meaning of this aggregate is
that producers choose the optimal mix between domestic goods and imports.
There are two possible destinations for the total supply from a geographical
criteria: the domestic and the foreign markets. Consequently, producers maximize
their revenue subject to a constant elasticity of transformation function (CET)10
nested in two levels. At a rst level, the resolution on the destination of goods
is between domestic and foreign markets. At a second level, producers resolve
the problem of choosing among dierent uses of goods destined for the domestic
market: gross capital formation, intermediate use and nal consumption.
Finally, production goods are transformed into nal consumption goods by
means of a xed coecients matrix. This implies a change in the accounting
classication of goods and services from production to consumption, in the same
sense as Ballard et al. (1985) (pp. 76-77).
2.2 Consumption
Private consumers are distributed in twelve households, according to the main
householder’s socioeconomic characteristics. Each household is endowed with a
xed amount of capital, skilled and unskilled labor. The xed amount of skilled
and unskilled labor should be interpreted as the maximum supply of labor because
we also consider the existence of leisure and unemployment.
Skilled and unskilled workers coexist in each household, and it is not possible
to move from one level to the other. For the versions of the model in which there
exists specic unskilled labor, each type of household is endowed with a certain
amount of specic and non-specic unskilled labor.
Households maximize a three-nesting level utility function subject to a budget
constraint from which we can derive demand functions. The rst nesting level
for each household is a Cobb-Douglas11 welfare function depending on saving and
aggregate consumption. The second nesting level shows the decision on aggregate
consumption between leisure and consumption of goods and services. At the third
nesting level, leisure is split between leisure for skilled and for unskilled labor, while
consumption is separated into dierent goods and services.
9The Armington (1969) assumption takes goods with dierent geographical origin as close but
not perfect substitutes.
10See Powell and Gruen (1968) for an analytic description of CET functions. CET functions
involve a certain degree of substitution among goods assigned to dierent markets or uses.
11Given our static approach, we consider a unitary elasticity of substitution between consump-
tion and saving (see Howe, 1975).
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2.3 Public sector
The starting point for modelling the public sector is the musgravian notion of
dierential incidence, which deals with the eects of substitution among taxes,
holding constant public revenue and expenditure. In a broader sense, we could
say that this notion involves the maintenance of the public sector dimension when
scal policy changes are applied.
The public sector equations in the model include public sector income, which
comes from capital rents, transfers from households and from the rest of the world,
and collection of taxes. Taxes include social security contributions paid by employ-
ers and employees, net indirect taxes, import taris and income taxes. All those
taxes are modelled as eective rates ad valorem estimated from benchmark data.
Macro closure for the public sector imposes the restriction that public invest-
ment and decit (or surplus) are exogenous and xed, so public savings are also
exogenous.
2.4 Investment and savings
Total investment is split into sectorial gross capital formation through a xed
coecients Leontief matrix (see Dervis et al. , 1981). In our static framework,
investment influences the economy as a component of nal demand. There also
exists a macro closure equation related to investment and savings. It states that the
dierence between total savings and total investment is the net lending/borrowing
for the economy.
2.5 Foreign sector
The country faces exogenous world prices, so we use the small open economy as-
sumption. This assumption implies that export demand and import supply func-
tions are perfectly elastic.
The foreign sector closure for a small economy follows de Melo and Tarr (1992).
This equation shows that the dierence between receipts and payments with the
rest of the world is again the net exogenous lending/borrowing of the economy.
This equation avoids, for example, a high increase in exports with no changes in
imports which would be unreliable as it would involve a continuous capital flow
from abroad.
2.6 Factor markets
Capital endowments are xed both for families and for the public sector. Capital is
internationally immobile, but perfectly mobile across domestic sectors so its price
adjusts to clear the market that is unique for the whole economy.
In addition, each household is endowed with a xed amount of skilled and un-
skilled labor. Due to the existence of leisure, the supply function would be elastic.
It is assumed that workers have some degree of market power and the way in which
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wages react is aected by aggregate unemployment. Hence, we use an equation
with a parameter  as a measure of wage flexibility. As  approaches innity, real
wages approach the benchmark value. The case where  approaches innity is the
rigid wages case because real wages do not change when the unemployment rate
changes. If  approaches zero, unemployment approaches its benchmark value, so
real wages are flexible. Other values of  show the greater or lesser sensibility of
real wages to changes in the unemployment rate.
Skilled labor is intersectorially mobile but unskilled labor is intersectorially
mobile only when it is homogeneous, and sector specic otherwise.
2.7 Immigrants
Immigrants are only endowed with unskilled labor. Furthermore, we assume that
immigrants and domestic unskilled workers are perfect substitutes in production.
In some versions of the model, immigrants are perfect substitutes for all unskilled
domestic workers, and in other versions they are only perfect substitutes for sector
specic unskilled domestic workers.
Illegal immigrants receive lower wages than native unskilled workers. The gap
between both wages is a xed wedge. For example, if wages for legal unskilled
workers are W us (or W uss in the specic sectors), then wages for illegal immigrants
are equal to (1 − )W us (or (1 − )W ussin the specic sectors), where  is the
wedge. In addition, workers do not pay taxes because they are assumed to be
working illegally.
Immigrants maximize a Cobb-Douglas welfare function dened over consump-
tion of goods and services and savings. Furthermore, a new demand function is
introduced in the model with immigrants, and market clearing equations change
both for factors and goods and services.
2.8 General equilibrium conditions
The model consists of three kinds of equations which can been seen in Appendix
2 and are summarized here:
1. Zero prot conditions (equations 1, 2, 3, 10, 13 and 26).
2. Market clearing in good markets (equations 4, 5, 11, 12, 14 to 16 and 19 to
22) and factor markets (equations 6 to 8).
3. Restrictions on disposable income (equations 18 and 23), unemployment (equa-
tions 29 and 30), transformation of goods (equations 9 and 17), and macro
closure (equations 24, 25, 27 and 28).
When immigrants are included in the model, equations 31, 31a, 31b, 32 and 33
replace equations 8, 8a, 8b, 22 and 19, respectively.
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3 Calibration
The model outlined has been calibrated with reference to the social accounting
matrix MCS-90 elaborated by Uriel et al. (1997). This data framework represents
the benchmark equilibrium for the model.
To calibrate scale and share parameters we use Rutherford’s (1999) method,
applied with software GAMS/MPSGE. The method starts with the balanced equi-
librium for the social accounting matrix as reference equilibrium, with a set of
elasticities from empirical evidence.
Calibration is carried out in three steps with this data. In the rst step, the
matrix collects quantities that are used as a rst reference point in the isoquant of
the calibrated function. In the second step, relative prices x the isoquant’s slope
at that point. Matrix data does not distinguish between prices and quantities, and
only indicates values. Hence, we follow Harberger’s assumption (see Harberger
(1972)) and choose the quantity units so that prices are unitary. This means that
value magnitudes from MCS-90 are equal to quantities.
The last step in calibration uses elasticities, which show isoquant curvatures.
In conclusion, we have the slope and curvature for a point in each isoquant, and
from them using Rutherford’s method we calibrate all the unknown parameters.
Elasticities for CES and CET functions are displayed in table 1. As commonly
used in computable general equilibrium models, elasticities of substitution between
labor and capital LKi and Armington elasticities 
A
i are from GTAP (see Hertel,
1997). Elasticities of transformation i are from de Melo and Tarr (1992). The es-
timations for the elasticities of substitution between leisure and consumption LQh
have been obtained using the Ballard et al. (1985) procedure from the uncompen-
sated elasticity of labor supply estimated in Garcia and Molina (1998)12. A total
of 40 hours worked per week, out of a potential 70 has been assumed. The results
for LQh are shown in table 2. Elasticities of substitution of the remaining equa-
tions are initially set to zero (for Leontief functions) and one (for Cobb-Douglas
functions). Finally, the  parameter, which explains the labor market behavior, is
xed at  = 1:5.13 The level of unemployment in the base year (Us and Uus) is
10% for skilled and 20% for unskilled workers.
4 Scenarios
We use the model sketched in the previous sections to raise two questions regarding
the situation of immigrants working in Spain. The rst one refers to the dierent
eects of immigration depending on the degree of mobility across sectors. The
second has to do with the role of wage discrimination. In the simulations that
12They estimated the own-wage labour supply elasticity for both men and women from dierent
functional forms. There is no evidence against the null that those elasticities are zero, so we use
this value as a starting point to calculate LQh .
13This is the value employed in MOISEES which is the Ministry of Economy wide macoeco-
nomic model for the Spanish economy.
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Agriculture 0.56 4.4 3.9
Energy and water 1.26 5.2 2.9
Non-energy minerals, chemicals 1.26 3.8 2.9
Metal and machinery 1.26 10.4 2.9
Other manufacturing 1.26 5.6 2.9
Construction 1.40 3.8 0.7
Commerce and hotel trade 1.26 3.8 0.7
Transport and communications 1.68 3.8 0.7
Finance and insurance 1.26 3.8 0.7
House renting 1.26 3.8 0.7
Other services 1.26 3.8 0.7
Note: Elasticities elaborated from Hertel (1997) and
de Melo and Tarr (1992).
Table 2: Elasticities by households
Household type
number Denition LQh
1 Rural, employed 0.428
2 Rural, self-employed, non-agricultural 0.057
3 Rural, self-employed, agricultural 0.037
4 Rural, other incomes, males 0.060
5 Rural, other incomes, females 0.038
6 Urban, employed, graduate 0.304
7 Urban, employed, non-graduate 0.402
8 Urban, self-employed 0.048
9 Urban, other incomes, males, under 65 0.087
10 Urban, other incomes, females, under 65 0.059
11 Urban, other incomes, males, over 65 0.062
12 Urban, other incomes, females, over 65 0.019
Note: Elasticities elaborated from Ballard et al. and Garca and
Molina (1998).
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follow, we focus on four scenarios depending on whether immigrant workers are
conned to a small part of the economic activities in the host country or not, and
on the existence of a wedge in the wages paid to immigrants with respect to native
workers. These scenarios can be depicted in the following way:
(1) SP −GAP : immigrants are locked up in selective sectors and they
earn a lower wage than their national counterparts ( = 0:4).
(2) SP : immigrants are locked up in selective sectors but they are paid
the same wage as native workers with the same level of qualications
( = 0).
(3) NSP −GAP : immigrants can work in any sector in the host econ-
omy but they are paid a lower wage than native workers ( = 0:4).
(4) NSP : immigrants can work in any sector in the host economy and
they are paid the same wage as native workers ( = 0).
Obviously, the dierent scenarios imply dierent levels of integration of the
foreign workers in the host economy. Thus, the rst scenario illustrates the worst
situation for immigrants, whereas if foreign workers can get a job in any activity
and they are paid the same wage as native workers with the same qualications
(scenario 4), they cannot be considered clandestine workers from an economic
point of view. We will call these extreme situations the short run and the long
run scenarios, as it is likely that restrictions to mobility disappear as time goes
by. Furthermore, from comparisons with transitory situations such as scenarios
(2) and (3) we can guess the additional impact on the economy due to better wage
conditions in the two regimes of mobility.
In order to decide which industries will concentrate foreign workers in scenarios
(1) and (2), we rely on statistics provided by OECD (1999). Table 3 displays the
distribution of legal immigrants by sectorial division.
Figures in table 3 mean that services have concentrated more than 57 per cent
of the average work permits in the four years depicted. Services and agriculture
together represent more than 78 per cent, and adding construction this gure
reaches almost 90 per cent of all the permits granted. Services is, however, a very
wide sector which includes many dierent activities. For the Spanish case, inside
services, commerce and the hotel trade is the activity which attracts the highest
number of unskilled workers. Therefore, we initially chose agriculture, construction
and commerce/hotel trade as the nal destination for those immigrants who will
not move freely among all the sectors. However, our assumption is that once they
are allocated to one of these three sector-specic labors they may move freely
among them, but cannot jump to other sectors in the economy.
We consider that immigrants (LusI ) stand for an initial impact of 10 per cent of
total domestic unskilled employment in the base year14.
14A dierent rate only changes the level of the eects with no variation in the quality of the
results.
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Table 3: Total work permits granted by sector
1994 1995 1996 1997
Agriculture 18.7 18.9 26.0 17.7
Industry 6.9 7.5 8.6 5.6
Construction 9.4 10.4 12.2 7.0
Services 50.6 57.2 72.7 51.9
Not specied 3.1 6.3 6.9 2.0
*In thousands of work permits.
Table 4: Eects of immigration on macroeconomic variables*
Sector-specic factor Non sector-specic factor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SP −GAP SP NSP −GAP NSP
GDP 2.168 1.434 2.059 1.244
CPI 1.002 1.000 1.011 1.004
EMPLOYMENT
Skilled labor 2.745 1.586 2.556 1.185
Unskilled labor (non specic) 3.166 1.962 4.901 3.459
Unskilled labor (specic) 8.385 6.910 - -
REAL RENTS
Capital 4.281 1.806 4.261 1.588
Skilled labor 1.441 0.472 1.341 0.239
Unskilled labor (non specic) 1.339 0.377 -0.672 -1.782
Unskilled labor (specic) -4.154 -5.230 - -
*Percentage variation from bechmark equilibrium except for IPC which is an index 1 in
the benchmark.
5 Results
The eects on macroeconomic variables of the dierent scenarios described above
are displayed in table 4. Columns (1) and (2) reproduce the case in which im-
migrants are conned to work only in some sectors. The rst column shows the
eect of migration when immigrants are paid a wage ((1− )W uss) that is 40%
lower than the wage of unskilled national workers, whereas in the second column
both groups are paid the same wage. Columns (3) and (4) reproduce both cases
but now immigrants are able to nd a job in any sector. Therefore, columns (1)
and (4) represent the two extreme situations that immigrants can face in the host
country.
Clearly, the arrival of foreign workers has two eects. Firstly, a higher popula-
tion increases the aggregate demand leading in time to a greater requirement for
all types of labor. Secondly, more competition in the unskilled labor market leads
to a reduction in the unskilled wage which in turn leads employers to substitute
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capital and skilled labor for unskilled labor.
Results conrm that increases in GDP and total employment occur as the
expected consequence of immigration, and the rise in employment is shared by
skilled and unskilled workers but because of decreasing marginal productivity in
the production function and the assumption of xed capital, growth in GDP is
smaller than growth in employment. However, in scenarios (1) and (2) as the
substitution eect only applies to the sector-specic labor market the only workers
that are worse o are the unskilled workers working in agriculture, construction and
commerce/hotel trade. In terms of employment, the initial impact stands for about
26 per cent of unskilled native workers in the three sectors. As, by assumption,
immigrants are not unemployed, a rise in total sector-specic unskilled employment
of 8.385 per cent (scenario 1) qualies for about a 17.6 per cent fall in native sector-
specic employment. Nevertheless, native unskilled labor and real wages in the rest
of the sectors increases as a consequence of the driven demand eect. The capital
factor and skilled labor also gain in all the cases considered.
The most striking outcome in the simulations is the (moderate) fall in GDP,
employment and rents as a result of wage equalization. This is due to the downward
movement of the native sector-specic labor demand curve that follows the rise in
the labor cost.
Immigration concentrated in only a few sectors benets the economy as compar-
ison of columns (1) and (3) (or (2) and (4)) reflects. The three sectors considered
are the most unskilled labor intensive and so unskilled immigration directed to-
wards these sectors is also the most ecient allocation.
The eect on the real rent of unskilled labor strongly depends on the immigrant
labor force being concentrated in the three sectors considered or whether they are
not concentrated in any sector in particular. When immigrants are specic factors,
unskilled workers in agriculture, construction and commerce/hotel trade lose out,
whereas the rest of unskilled workers gain. If immigrants are not a specic factor,
all unskilled workers lose out. However in this case the immigrants spread out all
over the activities, therefore lessening the impact on wages.
Let us now turn to a sectorial performance of the results. Table 5 and table
6 represent the short run and the long run scenarios. Table 5 corresponds to
the case in which immigrants are specic factors for some sectors and they earn
less than native workers with the same qualication. Output of all the sectors
in the economy increases, regardless of the fact that immigrants only work in
three of them. Similarly, there is a generalized rise in employment of all types of
labor. But the most striking result that arises from table 5 is the very important
contribution of immigration to the production of industries dierent to those which
match the immigrants’ destination. This is the case for energy and water; metal
and machinery and other manufacturing and the reason is the positive change in the
aggregate nal demand and the diusion eects via intermediate inputs. Another
important fact is the moderate expansion of construction in spite of being a sector-
specic immigrant labor. This is precisely the sector that due to the important
reduction in sector-specic unskilled wages to a higher degree substitutes away
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Table 5: Sectorial otcomes for the long run
Output Capital Skilled Unskilled
Employment Employment
Agriculture 2.252 1.033 0.260 6.114
Commerce and hotel trade 3.127 0.231 4.896 11.021
Construction 0.947 -5.152 0.319 6.177
Energy and water 6.056 4.764 8.489 8.598
Non-energy minerals, chemicals 1.127 -1.063 2.456 2.559
Metal and machinery 3.049 0.086 3.645 3.745
Other manufacturing 2.707 0.450 4.027 4.132
Transport and communications 1.572 -0.930 3.813 3.918
Finance and insurance 1.969 0.007 3.554 6.659
Other Services 0.983 -1.906 1.578 1.680
House Renting 1.342 1.246 4.841 4.497
*Percentage variation from bechmark equilibrium.
from capital and skilled labor to unskilled employment.
Table 6 shows the long run sectorial outcomes when immigrants are not con-
strained to working in a few activities and are not discriminated against. As
mentioned already, one straightforward consequence of labor mobility is that the
reduction in labor costs in agriculture, construction and commerce/hotel trade is
not dierent from the remaining sectors and, therefore, dierences across sectors in
the degree of factor substitution are reduced with respect to the short run. This is
why, for example, construction expands more in the long run than in the short run
even although the direct impact of the labor supply on it is now lower. Agricul-
ture and commerce/hotel trade, however, experience an important reduction with
respect to the short run, and consequently those sectors such as energy and water
and metal and machinery that beneted indirectly from pull (direct and indirect)
demand.
Changes in welfare in table 7 summarize who gains and who loses with immigra-
tion in terms of equivalent variations. Table 7 contains only the eect on welfare of
the six types of households whose main householder participates in the productive
process. The cases not displayed in the table correspond to main householders
whose basic source of income are transfers (principally from the public sector) or
rents.
All the households considered experience gains in the short run due to immigra-
tion, the bigger ones corresponding to the self-employed both in rural and urban
areas and the skilled employed in urban areas. This is an expected result that
holds whatever the wage regime for immigrants or the sector allocation. More
ambiguous are the results for the unskilled employed. Unskilled households (rural
and urban) are grouped according to the origin of the rents of the main house-
holder and are yet quite an aggregate group with heterogenous rents and sectorial
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Table 6: Sectorial otcomes for the long run
Output Capital Skilled Unskilled
Employment Employment
Agriculture 0.952 0.463 0.380 2.445
Commerce and hotel trade 1.643 0.470 2.570 4.680
Construction 1.080 -1.444 1.048 3.126
Energy and water 2.069 0.958 2.988 5.107
Non-energy minerals, chemicals 1.469 -0.545 1.473 3.560
Metal and machinery 2.741 0.077 2.096 4.197
Other manufacturing 1.544 -0.713 1.377 3.463
Transport and communications 1.294 -0.892 2.140 4.241
Finance and insurance 1.324 0.003 1.846 3.942
Other Services 0.599 -1.674 0.223 2.285
House Renting 1.025 0.953 2.874 4.990
*Percentage variation from bechmark equilibrium.
Table 7: Immigration eects on households welfare
Type of households sector-especic factor non sector-specic factor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SP −GAP SP NSP −GAP NSP
1. Rural, employed 0.844 -0.943 0.679 -1.300
2. Rural, self-employed, non agric. 3.507 1.535 3.485 1.362
3. Rural, self-employed, agricultural 3.000 1.374 2.991 1.249
6. Urban, employed, graduate 2.868 1.101 2.779 0.791
7. Urban, employed, non graduate 1.088 -0.752 0.924 -1.115
8. Urban, self-employed 4.013 1.752 4.031 1.572
*Percentage variation from bechmark equilibrium.
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Table 8: Eects of immigration on macroeconomic variables (flexible wages)
sector-specic factor non sector-specic factor
 = 0:5 (1) (2) (3) (4)
SP −GAP SP NSP −GAP NSP
GDP 2.067 1.880 1.971 1.762
CPI 0.997 0.998 1.010 1.006
EMPLOYMENT
Skilled labor 1.636 1.458 1.405 1.143
Unskilled labor (non specic) 2.221 2.032 5.423 5.149
Unskilled labor (specic) 11.327 11.011 -
REAL RENTS
Capital 3.835 2.485 4.021 2.554
Skilled labor 2.641 1.663 2.372 1.207
Unskilled labor (non specic) 2.533 1.570 -1.376 -2.478
Unskilled labor (specic) -7.832 -8.832 - -
*Percentage variation from bechmark equilibrium except for IPC which is an index 1 in
the benchmark.
representation. This is why when immigrants are considered as a specic factor
for some sectors, unskilled workers working in jobs that compete with immigrants
suer important losses in their real rents, but the improvement in employment and
incomes both from the non sector-specic unskilled labor and from capital and
skilled labor which also contribute to the household’s economy totally compensate
for this loss. Even so, in the long run, when immigrants compete with natives in
all the sectors and at the same wage, households working in rural areas and those
without qualication working in urban areas are damaged by immigration even at
a high level of aggregation.
5.1 Sensitivity analysis
Here we measure the sensitivity of our results to changes in selective parameters and
assumptions in the model. We focus on the parameter , as a way of characterizing
the labor market rigidities, and the number of sectors which hire specic unskilled
labor in which immigrants are included.
We have assumed, up to this point, an intermediate strategy for trade unions
that weighs both the unemployment rate and real wages in the union’s objective
function. Now, we repeat our experiments under the assumption that  = 0:5.
This new value for the parameter implies a higher flexibility in real wages.
Table 8 shows the macroeconomic outcomes. More flexible wages causes the
dierences between the short and the long run to be narrower, due mainly to a
larger impact on the economy when immigrant wages are on a level with native
wages. In terms of welfare (table 9), all households do still prefer that immigrants
are discriminated against. However, greater flexibility of wages enhances the wel-
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Table 9: Eects on househols welfare (flexible wages)
sector-specic factor non sector-specic factor
 = 0:5 (1) (2) (3) (4)
SP −GAP SP NSP −GAP NSP
1. Rural, employed 0.719 -0.196 0.546 -0.490
2. Rural, self-employed, non agric. 3.127 2.082 3.280 2.154
3. Rural, self-employed, agricultural 2.676 1.813 2.829 1.907
6. Urban, employed, graduate 2.564 1.674 2.513 1.473
7. Urban, employed, non graduate 0.953 0.011 0.786 -0.279
8. Urban, self-employed 3.561 2.365 3.796 2.483
*Percentage variation from bechmark equilibrium.
Table 10: Short run eects without construction sector
 = 1:5  = 0:5
(1) (2) (1) (2)
SP −GAP SP NSP −GAP NSP
GDP 2.583 1.759 2.611 2.308
CPI 0.997 0.998 0.991 0.994
EMPLOYMENT
Skilled labor 2.740 1.695 1.581 1.444
Unskilled labor (no specic) 3.005 1.993 2.012 1.881
Unskilled labor (specic) 13.328 11.325 19.001 18.410
REAL RENTS
Capital 4.232 1.912 3.638 2.391
Skilled labor 1.462 0.572 2.632 1.760
Unskilled labor (non specic) 1.326 0.463 2.423 1.590
Unskilled labor (specic) -7.386 -8.599 -10.316 -10.424
*Percentage variation from bechmark equilibrium except for IPC which is an index 1 in
the benchmark.
fare results in the non discrimination scenarios reducing (or even eliminating) the
losses of unskilled employed workers and increasing the gains for the other groups.
Finally, in table 10 we drop Construction from the set of sectors which concen-
trates immigrants as a specic factor. This sector contains a substantially smaller
share of foreign workers that obtain a work permit than Agriculture and Com-
merce/Hotel trade, and its elimination allows us to check the eects of narrowing
the scope of job possibilities for immigrants. As a way of comparison, only scenar-
ios (1) and (2) now make sense. And comparing gures in table 10 with those in
table 8 and table 4 a further growth in GDP and employment is detected.
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6 Conclusions
The results of this paper have indicated the importance of the initial immigrants
allocation in the labor market. Our ndings were illustrated by simulations us-
ing a large multisectorial computable general equilibrium model. Two cases were
considered related to the degree of mobility across sectors. After analyzing the
eects of illegal immigrants locked up in a few sectors, we moved on to the study
of legal immigrants that move freely in the economy. The comparison between
both situations draws a rst approximation to the short run and long run eects
of immigration.
Results show that any type of immigration has an unequivocal helpful eect
on GDP and total employment and that legalization is especially important for
improving total unskilled employment. This fact means that domestic substitution
by foreign workers is not perfect. Nevertheless, while skilled workers and capital
owners gain from immigration and legalization, the eects on the wages of unskilled
workers depends on the working sector when immigration can be considered as a
sector-specic factor.
As most of the income origin for Spanish families is heterogeneous, we look
likewise to the welfare eect on households. Interestingly, the bulk of the dierent
types of households considered here prot from the influx of illegal immigrants
and their legalization. Only those households headed by unskilled workers are
damaged, the loss in this case being much less important than when unskilled
workers are considered individually. Conversely, households whose main provider
is either self-employed or a skilled worker all benet from immigration.
All the productive sectors regard to expand their production and their demand
for labor. In the short run output increases in all the sectors in the economy and
this is independent of the fact that immigrants only work in some of them. In
addition to the obvious direct impact on sectors for which foreign workers are a
specic factor, immigration in the short run also has an important indirect eect
on industries such as Energy and water, Metal and machinery and Other man-
ufacturing. In the long run, sectorial eects are more evenly distributed on the
economy.
Results rely on some key assumptions and therefore the sensitivity of the equi-
librium to dierent parameters of the model has been checked. Especially impor-
tant seems to be the way in which wages respond to a labor supply shock. The
simulations in this case indicate that more flexible wages tighten the dierences
between the short and the long run, reducing the short run eect and enlarging
the long run eect.
The sensitivity analysis on the size of the market for newcomers concludes that
there indeed exists a chance to broaden immigration while minimizing social costs.
It could entail an active redistributive policy but the nal point that comes up
from all the sets of results is that immigration, when targeted towards very specic
sectors, multiplies the positive impact on aggregate production and employment,
variables from which, in the end, is hinged aggregate welfare.
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APPENDIX 1 - NOTATION
As a general rule, the notation in the model is as follows: endogenous variables
are denoted by capital letters, exogenous variables by capital letters with a bar,
and parameters by small Latin and Greek letters.
There are n (i; j = 1; : : : ; n) production sectors. In versions of the model
with specic factors, ns are sectors with specic factors, and nns sectors do not
have specic factors (ns + nns = n). The goods produced by these n sectors are
transformed into m (k = 1; : : : ; m) consumption goods, of which good m is public
nal consumption; whereas good m − 1 is residents’ consumption abroad. There
exists r (h = 1; : : : ; r) private households.
Table 11: Endogenous variables
Symbol Denition
Ai Armington aggregate (sector i)
CFi Final domestic consumption in goods from sector i
CPUB Public consumption
DISTi Distributed production (sector i)
EXPi Exports (sector i)
FC Conversion factor
Ii Investment or gross capital formation in goods from
sector i
IIij Intermediate inputs produced by sector j and used by
sector i





h Revenue from income taxes on labour
ITi Revenues from taris (imports of goods from sector
i)
Ki Capital (sector i)
Li Labor (sector i)
NITi Revenues from indirect taxes which burden sector i
Oi Domestic oer from sector i
Pk Consumption good k price
Psav Savings price
PAi Average cost for Armington aggregate (sector i)
PDISTi Average cost for distributed production (sector i)
PLi Average cost for labor used in sector i
POi Average cost for goods sold into domestic market (sec-
tor) i
PV Ai Average cost for primary factors (sector i)
PXi Average cost for efective production (sector i)








Qhsav , QIsav Demand (savings)
R Rent of capital
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Table 11: Endogenous variables (cont.)
Symbol Denition
SOCCEi Revenues from social contributions pais by employers,
which burden sector i
SOCCWi Revenues from social contributions pais by employees,
which burden sector i
Us; Uus; Uuss Unemployment rates for skilled, unskilled and specic
unskilled labour
V Ai Primary inputs used by sector i
W s, Wus, Wuss Wages for skilled, unskilled and specic unskilled
labour
Xi Efective production (sector i)
Y G Public sector income
Yh Disposable income for household h
Y I Disposable income for immigrants
I Prots in investment
Ai Prots in Armington aggregate
CETi Prots in CET function
Li Prots for labor
LKi Prots for value added
Xi Prots for production
Table 12: Exogenous variables and parameters
Symbol Denition
ai Share parameter
bi, bnsi , b
s
i Share parameter
BALPUB Public sector balance
c0i; cji Share parameter










INV PUB Public investment
INV TOTAL Total investment
iti Tari ad valorem rates which burden sector i










I Endowment for household h of skilled, unskilled and spe-
cic unskilled labour
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Table 12: Exogenous variables and parameters (cont.)
Symbol Denition
niti Indirect taxes ad valorem rates which burden sector i
NLB Net lending/borrowing
NTPSh Net transfers given by public sector and received by r
household h




qij Transformation coecients (efective production into dis-
tributed production)
SAV PUB Public sector savings
soccwi Social contributions ad valorem rates paid by employees
which burden sector i
soccei Social contributions ad valorem rates paid by employers
which burden sector i
TNROWh Net transfers given by the rest of the World and received
by household h
TNROWG Net transfers given by the rest of the World and received
by public sector
Us; Uus; Uuss Unemployment rates for skilled, unskilled and specic un-
skilled labour
i Scale parameter
 Wage sensibility parameter








Ai Armington elasticity (sector i)










 i Share parameter
i Share parameter
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APPENDIX 2 - EQUATIONS
In this Appendix we present equations included in the model, according to
sections where they have been explained: production, consumption, public sector,
investment and savings, foreign sector, factor markets and immigrants.
Production
Xi = PXi − c0iPV Ai −
nX
j=1
cjiPOj = 0 (1)














1−LKi = 0 (2)
With homogeneous unskilled labor we use equation 3, and with specic unskilled
labor we substitute it by equations 3a (i = 1; : : : ; nns) and 3b (i = 1; : : : ; ns):




W s(1 + soccei + soccwi)
bi









W s(1 + soccei + soccwi)
bnsi









W s(1 + soccei + soccwi)
bsi


































Equation 8 is used with homogeneous unskilled labor, and we replace it by
equations 8a and 8b to include specic unskilled labor:
rX
h=1


























q11 q12 : : : q1n























i (PDISTi(1 + niti))





















i + (1− di)−i(PFXFC)i+1
 1












Oi = Ii +
nX
j=1
IIij + CFi (16)
0BBBBB@
o11 o12 : : : o1n





o(m−2)1 o(m−2)2 : : : o(m−2)n


















s(Lsh −Qhls)(1− Us)(1− incsh) +
+W us(Lush −Qhlus)(1− Uus)(1− incush ) +
+W uss(Lussh −Qhluss)(1− Uuss)(1− incussh ) +













With homogeneous unskilled labor we use equation 21, and with specic un-





















Y G = RKG +
nX
i=1
(SOCCEi + SOCCWi) +
nX
i=1











NTPSh + TNROWGFC (23)
BALPUB = SAV PUB − INV PUB (24)
CPUB = PmQm = Y
G − SAV PUB (25)
Investment and savings
I = PINV −
nX
i=1
liPOi = 0 (26)































Equation 30 appears when unskilled lobar is included in the model, and is





























Equation 31 is applied in the homogeneous unskilled labor version of the model,
and equations 31a and 31b in the specic factor version:
rX
h=1
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